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Post-Cold War Structure in 
the Asia-Pacific Region 
The bipolar structure that dominated the international re- 
lations In the Asia-Pacific region in the Cold War is no more. 
Where hitherto the Soviet Union constituted one of the two 
major protagonists, it has now been broken up into many 
states. Russia, the biggest of these states and generally per- 
ceived to be the succerssor state to the Soviet Union, has 
stopped promoting communism in the region. Economic re- 
construction is now its primary aim. On the other hand, the 
United States, absent now the Soviet enemy and absorbed 
with strengthening its domestic economy, no longer possesses 
the will and the wherewithal to sustain its Cold War mission. 
What new security and economic structures will replace this 
bipolar one? 
This is a question of no less interest to those in the cor- 
ridors of power charged with ensuring the increase of their 
nations' gross national product and their sovereignty than to 
armchair theoreticians of academia inclined to speculate 
about new world orders. For indeed much of the economic 
pro pertly and the security also of many of the nations of the 
Ast -P ctltc r glon rid on the em rgenc of an order condu- 
cive I th in Int n nc CJ f both. hu , befitting the ubject's 
lrnp t I nc \ th r I no I k of e n w r or tt pis at an wers 
Io I his qu •sllc 1 i. Out JI su h prof u ion, I h ve chosen to 
COi ld 't lw Iha! I c n Id r to e the most important; and 
upon whl h xarnln ti n of their tr ngths and weaknesses, I 
slir~ll off 11 rny own om 'Pll 11 f wh,1l tlm n >w lructure will 
( nd c uld) b l, 
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trends in the international relations of the globe, and indeed 
of the Asia-Pacific region. While the literature on these two 
theories are much more sophisticated than what will be pre- 
sented here, I will nevertheless focus primarily on the basic 
arguments found in such theories, and their applicability to the 
topic in question. 
Adherents of the interdependence school contend that flows 
of trade and investment in the globe, including the Asia-Pacific 
region, have reached (and may continue to reach) such a high 
volume and quality that the interdependence they create will 
increasingly govern the relations among the states of the 
region. Nations will realise that they need to trade with, and 
in many cases to Invest In, each other In order to prosper and 
survive. Such economic relations is not, to use a jargon, a 
zero-sum game whereby one nation's gain is the other nation's 
loss. Rather one nation's gain is also that other nation's gain 
as one nation's loss is also that other nation's loss. It is thus 
not conceivable nations will go to war in this interdependent 
world, as the costs of war will outweigh the benefits to the 
eventual victor. 
Interdependence theorists point to the interaction of indus- 
trialised democracies as a good example, such as that between 
Japan and the United States. The comprehensive web of 
economic linkages, including direct and indirect investment, 
and trade make any break between both highly unlikely, and 
war between both very Improbable. For if such were to happen, 
both will lose as much as they would gain. The e theorl ts 
concede the argument by some I h I economl Int rd p nd- 
ence per se Is no guarantee of peace, a. hown In th c 
of 19th century zurope, where uch Int rd p nd nc did n l 
prevent the uropean nation from I ught ring ch th r In 
World War I. But there Is a cruel I differ nc th n In th I 
interdependence was not of tr I glc n lur , unltk wh t 
obtains now in Western Europe and in the US-J p n r I lion . 
The necessary food and raw m terlal need d by lh Eur • 










mainly from the less developed areas and colonies. Britain, the 
most Important power then sought "to make its empire a unit 
largely independent of trade with the rest of the world." 1 Not 
so in US-Japan relations today, and for that matter in inter- 
action among the nations of contemporary Western Europe. 
Their economic links are strategic links. What happens in the 
economy of Germany affects vitally that of France and the rest 
of Western Europe. One example is German interest rate which, 
if raised, would affect the recovery from recession of many of 
these European countries. Similarly, if the American market 
were to be closed to Japanese exports, the Japanese economy 
could be profoundly dammaged. Few thus can Im gine Japan 
going to war with the United States today over economic 
differences, anymore than one believes Germany will war with 
France to recover its lost territories. 
While not without merit, the interdependence school how- 
ever does not take into account the subjective element. What 
may objectively be a case of genuine interdependence to one 
party may be perceived by the other to be domination, or to 
use a jargon, be seen as asymmetrical rather than symmetrical 
interdependence. This could happen when cultural differences 
exist between both or when one party is so used to being in 
a dominant position that it finds it difficult to tolerate an equal 
or superior position by the other. The US-Japan relations is 
a good case in point. One would not for example consider the 
United States, the mightiest economic power in the world to 
be more d pendent on Jap n than the other way round. Yet 
nly r w y r go, wh n J n w s erforming spectacu- 
1 rly w II In th conomlc r n , these w no lack of voices 
n I\ •rl wa nine: f /\ rl Ing ov rrun by a Japanese 
n mlc jugg rn ut. Th r was even talk of California turn- 
In Int erf ectur of J n! It I quite possible had such 
ti n II m n t • h ck d It could h ve led to the unrav- 
llln of c o le r I lion th t lght e from an objective 
, t d I I ulwlly b n flcl I. ~ortu t ly th t dldl not hap- 










establishments took steps to play the Japanese threat down. 
Such subjectivity underscores the need for some non-economic 
grouping, be it the governments of both countries or what- 
ever, to manage this economic interdependence. 
It is however in the two other levels of interaction, or lack 
of interaction, that the interdependence school is less convinc- 
ing in explaining stability of interaction among states. One 
level is in the relations between the economic powerhouses 
with the more prosperous developing countrues of the region. 
Take, for example, Japanese relations with ASEAN, where in 
matters of trade and investment, ASEAN is so much more 
dependent on Japan than the other way around. As an ex- 
ample, the percentage of Japan-AS-AN trade f total ASEAN 
trade in the past 25 years or o Is well over 20%, touching 
nearly 30% at one stage while il is about 12% the other way 
round. A distruption of this trade will thus affect ASEAN far 
more than Japan. While ASEAN has so far accepted such 
asymmetrical interdependece as a necessary stage towards its 
industrialization, relations have not always been so stable (as 
exemplified by the riots in Jakarta and Bangkok against the 
visit of Tanaka, the then Japanese PM to ASEAN countries 
in 1974), and may deteriorate if such asymmetry is perceived 
to be a permanent condition. 
But where the interdependence school is at its weakest is 
precisely where interdependence is at the least, and that is in 
the other level of relations between those little touched by 
interaction with the more prosperous nations of the Asia- 
Pacific region. Even s urning lh I Int rdependenc in Itself 
does conduce to stability, the c mm nd ( r f rrner mm nd) 
economies of Myanmar, Indochina, North Kor , th non- 
coastal areas of China nd the Ru I n ~ r ~ I nj y, If ,my, 
tenuous links with the other more pr p r u I I f th 
Asia-Pacific region. If these tales and r 
impoverished as a result of their relative 1 ck f Int. gr lion 
with the Asia-Pacific economy, lhey could revert I mllll nl 










We need not have to wait in some cases. North Korea now 
threatens to develop nuclear weapons and missiles and is willing 
to heighten tension in Northeast Asia, even to the extent of 
provoking war, probably because it feels it has nothing to 
lose, given its isolation from the prosperous Asia-Pacific 
economy. 
In short, for interdependence to work, there should be a 
hegemon to ensure that the interdependent nations are play- 
ing by the rules of the game, subjective perception notwith- 
standing, and to deploy the power to ensure that these rules 
are not disrupted by others. The United States was one such 
power during the Cold War. It is now however evincing a deep 
reluctance lo conlinue being the sole power rop ing up the 
A la-Pacific international order. Atlas is shrugging, and no 
clear power stucture has emerged to replace this Atlas. 
And it is here, one should consider the other theory which 
comes to grips with the element of power not much consid- 
ered by the interdependence school, the theory of the balance 
of power. This theory it is claimed has been practised for 
many centuries, though the modern form began in the 
seventeeth century in Europe with Candinal Richilieu when he 
introduced the concept of raison d'etat, or reason of state 
against the universalism of those seeking to reimpose the Holy 
Roman Empire. So widely practised and invoked is this theory 
that, among other things, it has been used both to de cribe 
the actual re lily of international relation and a a guide to 
p licy m ker .It i in the latter en e thi theory i here on- 









relevant powers in the Asia-Pacific region, and much like Great 
Britain in nineteenth century Europe, ensures that no one 
power dominates the Asian region, as it would be strategically 
dangerous to the United States. Such a power would, in 
Kissinger's own words, "have the capacity to outstrip America 
economically and, in the end, militarily. That danger would 
have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently 
benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would 
find itself with a grossly diminished capacity to shape events". 2 
In other words, the United States should be the "holder" of 
the balance. If any power or a combination of powers prove 
too preponderant for the others, the Uniled States should put 
its weight to that other power In rder t rest re the balance. 
Or, if not, take steps to cut that rising dominant power to size. 
Not irrelevant Is Kissinger's observation that the practice 
of the balance of power beginning with the Congress of Vi- 
enna in 1815, brought a century of peace to Europe. Except 
for the Crimean War of 1854, there was no general war until 
WW 1 in 1914. The implication is that both situations (Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific) are not uncomparable. The statesmen in 
Vienna believed that Europe was exhausted by the Napoleonic 
Wars over the spread of revolutionary ideals and that the 
peace of the continent could best be achieved not by any 
further appels to ideology or other forms of ideals but by 
balancing power. By the same token, the communist powers 
of China and Rusia and the Uniled Stales may also be ex- 
hausted by their battle over ideology, and are now su cepllble 
to purely power calculation . 
But just as the Interdependence theory l k little ccount 
of the element of power, the b I nee f power p y liltl h d 
to economic Interdependence. Th f t f t d y's sc n I· 
cally interdependent world tog ther with th f t th t J? w >r 
is increasingly defined In economic l rm , k It dllllcul! for 
the United States, for example, to be the hold r f the b I nc 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Take Japane nd Arn rlc n 









to the point of threatening the balance, the United States, if 
it is not expedient to put its weight to the other side, would 
have to resort to cutting Japan down to maintain the balance. 
Yet as a very strong element of rising Japanese power will be 
economic in nature, can the United states reduce this eco- 
nomic stength without hurting itself. Consider that of Japanese 
motor car transplants such as Toyota and Honda in the United 
States. While they are Japanese owned, they employ many 
Americans and have spill over effects to the local economies 
in which they are situated. To reduce Japan's economic 
strength, the United States may have to close down such 
transplants; but doing so also hurt the United tate a much 
as Japan. 
It Is also open to question whether, given the different 
power capacities of the relevant actors, a balance can be that 
easily achieved. Kissinger himself states that calculations of 
balance are a very complex exercise. He writes this of a period 
before economic power became increasingly important in 
international affairs. If it was so complex with conventional 
calculations of military strength, how much more so when 
economic strength has to be taken into account. It is common 
knowledge that for the moment Japan does not matter much 
as a military power because of Japanesse constitutional inhi- 
bition on offensive deployment of its military and the as yet 
full development of its military capacity. But it is nevertheless 
an economic superpower. How then does Japan relate to a 
power b I nee when it cannot deploy troop off en ively and 
I d end nl on not her pow r (the United tat } for it 
rot II n? on Ider u I , wh ch po e e a great rnili- 
1 < 1 y 1 ell ~mc1 a blq nucl r r n I, ut conomica lly is in 
sh, mbl 1s. I II I flu n on lh power I nee greater or less 
lh n ,J p r ? Mor ov r, of all four, only the nited States is 
1 I ,I' su in w r n lh I It o e e ml! tary, political 
non I tr ngll whll hln rl Ing uperpower. 
U 1 cl t I cl In the conomic, milHary and 










if it takes an interest, matters only militarily. China can act 
militarily and economically to some extent. No such diffusion 
of power occurred in. 19th century Europe where military 
strength constituted the prime definition of power. Modern 
Metternichs and Bismarcks thus will have their minds fully 
stretched to the limit to work out a balance in such a situation. 
And where, one may ask, are the modern Metternichs and 
Bismarcks? The Japanese leaders are pusillanimous as to their 
international role; the president of the US cares only about 
domestic affairs; and the Chinese leaders are worried primarily 
about economic development and the post-Deng succession. 
There is also the nature of the states involved. Rus ia and 
China are no longer r v lutl nary tates in that they have 
basically given up th mis Ion f preading c mmuni m world- 
wide. Japan bvl u ly h n ide I gy of any kind. 
"Econornisrn", n l ev ngell mi it primary g al. 1 lence, these 
three states can be considered to a great extent traditional 
(though Russia in some future date may revert to old missions 
like Pan Slavism and so on), or non-ideological states that are 
succeptible to balance of power considerations. Not so the 
US. The United States considers itself exceptional from other 
states in that it is a state conceived in liberty. It is in essence, 
we are told though others think it mere sanctimony, an evangeli- 
cal state that has as its primary aim the spreading of democ- 
racy and human rights throughour the world. Exhaustion from 
its Cold War mission notwith landing, it can n mor c t ff 
moral considerations from it f reign relali n lhan it can a l 
off it own skin. /\ny b I n of p wer oll y i ther f r 
inimical t tht Ide II tic Arn rl n Ir dill n. N w f r b I 
of power lo work, a big pow r, p rt! ul rly n ' bl 
United Stat s, c nnol lnj I "lrr ti n, I" n Id r; lions Ilk' 
human rights and democr cy I ·1h I ul ti n f lr I n , 
anymore than China and Rus: la, • th y did In th> old W r, 
could make It work by pushing rev lull n ry Id I Ilk> 
munism. This can be seen in lhe !Int n < dmlnbtl\)11 1 ' 










dropped recently) which made dialogue then between the two 
very difficult. Without such dialogue that allows for rational 
consideration of the national interest of all the powers con- 
cerned, the balance cannot be achieved. This is not to say 
morality is not important for the success of a balance. But it 
is a morality of shared values, of what- the relevant powers 
agree as to what the rules of the game should be; and in this 
the United States does not seem to be playing by the rules 
others adopt. It may be ultimately that the logic of the balance 
will triumph, that whatever "idealistic" approach the United 
States Insists on taking will ultimately give 
1 
way to power con- 
siderations (as Clinton's delinking of the M N f r Chin nd 
human rights will indicate). Or that human rights and democ- 
racy will not be "Irrational" but constitute the shared values 
of all the relevant powers. Such adjustment if it comes how- 
ever will take time. 
What then will the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific structure be 
like if both the interdependence and the balance of power 
approaches do not satisfactorily describe it? Probably not one 
that can fit well into one all embracing theory. 
In the first place, an overaching security organization like 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO is unlikely to 
be established. NATO developed from a shared perception on 
the part of its members of a common Soviet threat. Moreover, 
no fundamental political problems with each other aff ct the 
NATO member . Not o in the A ia-Pactilc region where there 
exl t territori I problem uch a the pratly in the outh 
hln , th North rn T r itori I di ut etw n us ia 
n J p n, th conflict f th two hina and o on: and al o 
hi t rlc: I llslr 1. I 1 i lnq fr m J n i p ri h m before the 
w 1 such a l> 1tw 'J I In nd J p n: and Japan and Korea. 
uch probl r s h v y t to be ov rcome. even during the Cold 
W , ti •r w s n ' cm corn 1 I nsiv I\ 1a- acilic security 
t u tur ar I st ommu: r . ·1 her wer in fact a series of 
bll,11 ral · nr r •nts b •tw • •n ti U 1l t t s nd some Asian 









the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SFA TO) and the 
Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) were confined to a 
particular area, basically Southeast Asia, arid had members 
from outside the Asia-Pacific region. One of the five powers 
for example was Great Britain. 
Nor is any continent transcending economic organization 
of the European Union (EU) variety likely to emerge. The 
European Union could succeed because of the common cul- 
tural back ground of its members. And despite a North-South 
division of the richer northern European states and the poorer 
southern states of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, this 
division is not too great as to prevent common economic 
action. The Asia-Pacific region on the other hand Is a vast 
area consisting of nation of diverse cultural backgrounds, and 
great differences In the stages of economic development. Such 
differences have to be overcome for anything approaching 
even a less advanced stage of lntergration like a free trade 
agreement, let alone a European Union type grouping. One 
such attempt at a comprehensive structure, the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation APEC, is a long way from any free 
trade structure. 
What is likely to emerge threfore will be a complex struc- 
ture of overlapping alliances and groupings that have eco- 
nomic and security functions. On the economic side, the group- 
ing may be classified into three types. The first may be called 
a supra regional grouping. Essentially, such a grouping con- 
sists of countries having an economic agreement with another 
and revolving around one or two economic powerhou e . lob I 
examples are the European Union and the North A rl n 
Free Trade Agreement. The Asi -P clflc count rp rt r th 
Asia-Pacific conomlc Agr m nt nd th L" st J\sl n I· • 
nomic Caucus ( A C). A econd, which m yb II d mlddl 
regional grouping con Isl of gr uping f untrl wllh n I 
one economic powerhouse tandlng out, ven If on y 
claim a more advanced stage of developm nt th n th lh r. 










Indochinese countries and Yunnan in China, and the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA}. Sub-regional groupings consti- 
tute the third. Essentially, they consist of states or provinces 
or parts of countries which are contiguous to each other but 
which enjoy the economics of comparative advantege. They 
constitute what a scholar calls natural economic territories. 
Examples are Singapore, Johore-Riau Growth Tiangle (Sijori}; 
Taiwan and Hongkong with southern China; Indonesia-Malay- 
sia-Thailand Growth Triangle (!MT-GT); the Tumen grouping 
in Northeast Atsa, and so on. Many ot these three goupings 
have got off the ground while some are only making haste 
slowly or are In the proposal stage. It has to be added th t 
these groupings will not completely displace global multilateral 
groupings such as are based on the Uruguary Round an so 
on, and the state as economic actors in the Asia-Pacific re- 
gion. Rather they will co-exist uneasily with the two. A detailed 
analysis of this uneasy reltionship is of course very important 
but is beyond the scope of this lecture. 
Increasingly evident however is that the durability of such 
groupings rests on a common cultural or historical backgound. 
However "natural" the objective factors may tend towards 
economic cooperation, such cooperation is better achieved if 
such countries share common values about the management 
of economic affairs or have some experience of working to- 
gether before. This can be seen by two of the more u ce bul 
triangles. The longkong-Taiwan-South China triangle, prob- 
ably the mo t succ f ul, is a strikin e m le of the former. 
Not nly r th ople th r cultur lly irnilar ut they lo 
n le f rorn th r cial tock and hi torically were part 
( n , n ti n. Jori I n x m 1 of m le of the latter. 
'I h Ing 1 or -Johor • I u Isl nd complex was part of a 
flour! hlng r In the nineteenth century based on the trading 
nd c tltlv tlo f bl r n pepper. While the modern 
dlff r In th t rr s nt economic activities are 
or nuf cturtn , tourism and o on rather than 










enjoy the same factors of conducive proximity, experience of 
dealing with one another and with outside markets and so on 
that. they had developed in the past, even if such a common 
historical past is manifested more in deed than in word. Also 
with a chance to succeed is the IMT-GT which is perceived 
by some to be a revival of the historic trading links that had 
involved the areas around the northern part of the Straits of 
Malacca. 
So with supra regional groupings. The EAEC has not got 
off the ground primarily because of Japanese reluctance to 
join, reportedly as a result of American opposition. If the 
EAEC does take off It could have a common cultural basis in 
a rising Asian consciousness. East and Southeast Asia is of 
course much more culturally diverse than urope and In so far 
as there Is a collective consciousness, It is externally defined. 
Yet rising economic development, the awareness of a shared 
community-oriented philosophy as distinct from the western 
emphasis on indivludualism, a consensual approach to the 
resolution of problems and so on have made many East and 
Southeast Asians increasingly aware they have a common Asian 
cultural identity. 
If the EAEC presumes to be a cultural grouping searching 
for an economic framework, then APEC is an economic frame- 
work searching for a common culture. APEC members in- 
deed come from diverse cultures, the chief two of which are 
Western and Conf ucian, If Huntington is to be believed, both 
cultures are potentially antagonistic, if not handled properly. 
Is APEC then fated to be a economic groupin th t I 
response to the exlgencle f Intern lion I c nor I d >v slop 
ments In the Asla-P clflc regl n, but would n I I t I n 
meaningful enllly bee u It I ck mrnon ulun ii b 1'? 
There are many who y n . S me f th p Int t no 
sible Asian-influenced grouping th t In lud th W st ·st 
of North America, some of the cltl s of Au tr II and th 
sinicized and other East A lanlsed r of I\ ic . th >r, t rr u 










Asia. The former American Secretary of State, James Baker, 
points to the more than seven million Americans of Asian 
descent as justification. Yet others believe America is increas- 
ingly Asianised, and urge that in the third century of America's 
existence as a nation, it should not allow its European roots 
to cloud the fact that America's future is with Asia. All such 
justifications howerver are at best only partially convincing. 
The United States is not its West Coast only, even assuming, 
not necessarily a valid assumption, that this coast is dominated 
by Asian influence. Nor is seven million a very big percentage 
of a population of 250 rntllion, even if this seven million may 
develop to be an influential group. And while A iantzanon s 
a theme for America may be acceptable in some parts of the 
West Cost it will not. be with mainstream America. As the 
saying goes, it may play in San Francisco but it won't play in 
Peoria, Illinois. 
What may ultimately make APEC succeed however is if 
there is a convergence of an Asian communitarian spirit and 
a western type individualism. What is really at issue is not 
whether there is an Asianization of America or an Americani- 
zation of Asia but what system can best manage a twenty-first 
century society or international society. It is increasingly clear 
that this system, will neither be a rigid Confucian type nor one 
of untrammelled individualism arising from Western society at 
its worst. Rather it has to be a combination of both involving 
a democratic order that does not tot lly acrifice community 
Interest for individuali m. Ea t Asian ocietie are not without 
th tr ditlon of r i t nc g in t unju t ruler while Amen 
r n rll r e Wt mor th n oci ty of 250 million egos 
or wh 11 v 1r th popul !Ion th n. Th fact th t many East 
/\1-1!1\ll s cl "ll s 1 turning d mocr tic and many Americans 
of the need for cooperative endeavour (President 
k \rll 1 of co munltarlan vision for America) 











As to the security structure, it will consists of overlapping 
alliances and groupings brought about by bilateral and multi- 
lateral agreements. Of the former, the most important are the 
defence treaties the United States has with Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, and other defence arrangements it has with 
countries such as Singapore and Thailand. Other bilateral 
military agreements consist of those effected by some of the 
ASEAN countries with each other.The latter includes the Five 
Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) of Malaysia, Singapore, 
New Zealand, Australia and Britain, and the recently launched 
ASEAN Regional orum (ARF); and also Include adhoc meet- 
ings, official or otherwi e, to deal with specific not covered by 
the others .. An example Is the Indonesian-sponsored non-gov- 
ernmental meeting a few years ago on the Spratiys. 
It has to be said that a multilaeral forum like the ARF is 
still in its infancy while the FPDA Is confined to the limited 
area of Malaysia and Singapore. Hence, the biateral agree- 
ments enacted by the United States still remain the most 
important. The crucial bilateral treaties such as those with 
Japan and Korea had constituted the basic defence framework 
during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, however, 
many have questioned the continued validity of these bilateral 
agreements, if not actually call fo their abolition. Many Ameri- 
cans, for example question the need for their continuation 
when no common enemy now ex! ts, and In a voice not so 
sotto uoce ask why America h uld pend II tr ur lo d f 
Asian countries that could be a thre t lo Amer! 
cally. 
Others, many of them Asl n , tr 1.h Ir lm1 on n 
maintaining the stablllty of the I\ I -P ifl r gi n. Th 1y b '~ 
lieve the costs of maintaining Amerlc n b In J 1 n · nd 
Korea could be greatly subsidised by the ho l ountrl ( th y 










important to the economic health of the United States. An 
American withdrawal, particularly if it is precipitate one, could 
destabilize the rigion with adverse consequences on the econo- 
mies of both the region and United States. Thus, the bilateral 
agreements serve US interests as well as others, and could 
generate the goodwill which could aid American economic 
interests in the area. 
Whatever the pros and cons, such treaties, barring some 
cataclysmic developments, are likely to continue as a transi- 
tional phase to perhaps multilateral agreements where the US 
contribution may be deemed as not too onerous by the 
Americans themselves. 
As If this classlficatlon of groupings within their re pectlve 
economic and security spheres is not enough to suggest the 
complexity of this post-Cold War Asia-Pacific structure, this 
complexity Is further compounded by the nature of the Inter- 
action with each other in their own sphere, be it economic or 
security; and then across the other. 
Thus, in the economic sphere, members of sub-regional 
groups such as Sijori (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia} are 
also members of larger groupings like AFf A, the proposed 
FAEC and APEC though they area not members of the Thai 
Baht Zone and the Southern Chinese Growth area. Non- 
membership of other goupings may not matter much here but, 
that may not be the case for others. For example, the pro- 
posed EAEC does not include Australia, New Zeal nd Canada 
and the United States. 
Au tr II for x gr tly ffect y thi 
b . hi trad is with the proposed 
f th !\. . om lie ting th ictur further is a 
N!\l I!\ to d v lop link with certain Asia - Pacific 
ov I p Ing membership or otherwise most 
rr ct on e ch other. 
, the \lateral agreement 
a profound influence on 










members. By the same token what happens to the security of 
Southeast Asia affects Japan. Yet Japan is not a party to any 
defence arrangement there. 
And of security organizations affecting economic ones and 
vice versa, the bilateral US-Japan defence agreement for 
example, most surely would influence the region's economy. 
If it were abrogated, APEC would be drastically affected while 
the EAEC would likely become a reality. Conversely, if APEC 
does not succeed or if EAEC succeeds, either, but particularly 
the latter, will influence negatively American thinking on its 
defence agreement with Japan. 
Is the alternative to the bipolar structure then one of various 
groupings going into different directions as t cause confusion, 
if not instability, that may arise from such grouping colliding 
rather than cooperallng with each other? The answer is yes 
and so. Yes, In the en e that the trends In the international 
economy and security are such that such complexity cannot 
easily be avoided. No, in that all these can be held together 
by a big power or a group of big powers. That big power is 
obviously the United States and the group of other big powrs 
are Japan, China and possibly Russia. Yet given the fact that 
the United states has as yet an unclear idea what its Asia- 
Pacific role today should be, and, as mentioned, also the United 
States and the others are still to find a balance, the stage is 
set for some others such as the smaller powers and entities 
to play some role in influencing the economic and security 
structure. 
It has to be emphasized, nevertheles giv n the xperience 
of the smaller ur pe n power In rep n hi toiy, th t 
fluid or an unstable power b lance, while giving !')I rtunlty 
to small power on one h nd I m n uvr , n I b 1 
inimical to their long-term Int r I , f r th Ir Int c 1kl b 
brushed aside when the big power r bu y trylnc It , ( r ) 
among themselve . Or sm ll p wer r y b t m1 I 1 to slcl 
with one or two powers, which If ult!m I ly triu h nt In th 










reward their small allies more than if these small allies had 
stood on the sidelines. One the other hand, if these small 
powers backed the wrong side, they could suffer. It can even 
be argued that the the interests of the small powers would best 
be served by a stable power balance whereby they have a 
protector in one of them (as the low countries had in Great 
Britain in the nineteenth century) or wherby mutual suspicionof 
each other forced the big powers not to interfere in a small 
power (as was the case of Belgiums independence in 1830). 
Thus, one may see as a contemporary example of the former 
in South Korean relations with the United States, which during 
the Cold War protected it from North Korea and China and 
the USSR. 
But the situation is quite different now in the Asia-Pacific ~ 
region where big powers are increasingly reluctant to act like ~~ 
the traditional big powers of European history and where eco- 
nomic interdependence is important. Thus, small powers here 
have an unprecedented opporutnity to influence those areas E 
in which the big powers feel constrained to act. And the ~ 
effectiveness of the smaller powers depends, in my opinion ~ 
on three things. "They should not pursue policies that are in g 
conflict with the fundamental interests of these big powers. ,_, 
This may sound tautological but it is not. Between actions that ~ 
harm big power interests and the present status quo lies a big 
area where small powers can manoeuvre. For example the 
big powers like Japan and the United States are not against 
any move to form an Asia-Pacific wide economic organization 
(at fir t, J p n w mer keen while the nited tat re- 
m In d n) but could not them elve lniti te uch for fear 
of ml Int r r I lion by oth r big powers or for fear of charges 
fl I< dornln lion by th II r on . hus, small powers like 
K nd Au tr II could Initiate the establishment of APEC 
nc.J lnfl nc II ·ub uent structure. Similarly, the 
big pow t 1 J n t 1 I tclnl to th establishment of an security 
forum th l coul d I with region I security issues but could 










not do so for APEC. Here an entity like ASEAN could step 
in and influence the security debate. This ASEAN did with the 
formation of the ASEAN regional forum. 
But for the small powers to be effective they must possess 
certain characteristics the big powers find aceptable. Increas- 
ingly, these characteristics consist of an impressive economy 
and a record of a good governance, which means more and 
more a democratic government. Thus, South Korea, Australia 
and ASEAN have reasonable claims to such characteristics 
though they vary with each. South Korea has the most impres- 
sive economic performance while Australia is the most demo- 
cratic from a Western viewpoint. ASEAN has an impressive 
economic performance too and a reasonable record of govern- 
ance. 
The force of this argument can be seen in comparison 
with countries like Myanmar, Indochina and North Korea. 
Because they all have unlmpreslve economic performances 
and because some of them are practitioners of egregious human 
rights violations, they will not be taken seriously had they 
suggersted any regional economic or security forums. 
But the ability of South Korea and Australia to influence 
events is limited. South Korea has only a population of about 
forty million. In addition, it is a divided part of a nation that 
is a small one in East Asia. Australia, though a continents, has 
a population of only 18 million. While it has made tremendous 
strides towards Asian status, It Is as yet fully accepted as one 
in some Asian quarters. In this connection, ASEAN thus stand 
the best chance among the small entities to influence the 
structure. 
ASEAN has a total population f well over 300 1111 n, 
thus giving It a gre ter clout th n H1 tw th r rn II r 
ers. While ASEAN counlrl m y n t b . fully d m lie 
as Australia, they neverthele , with the oc I n I utbr ak f 
political violence and human right vi I Ii n , h v r I tlv ly 
good record of governance. This combln d with th Ir impr - 










outside Asia. Singapore (and increasingly Malaysia) is seen as 
a model by many Africans and even by people as far away 
as in Kazakhstan. Moreover, ASEAN has momentum on its 
side in that many countries in Southeast Asia, and outside it, 
are interested in joining. 
On a structural level, ASEAN is the only gouping of coun- 
tries that straddle both economic and security functions in the 
form of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum. It can thus as a grouping move quite easily 
from the economic area to the security area. 
Yet, despite all these advantages, ASEAN Is most hesitant 
to take up the challenge of Influencing the economic and 
security structure of the Asia-Pacific region. It Is still plagued 
with doubts about its ability to maintain its cohesion in a wider 
Asia-Pacific region despite many years of experience in devel- 
oping a common stand. Progress towards an ASEAN Free 
Area has been very tardy when it should not be. And it is still 
very cautious despite the ARF to confront Asia-Pacific wide 
security issues at a time of rapid geopolitical changes. 
Such should not be the case for ASEAN is now presented 
with an unique historical opportunity to shape the post-Cold 
War Asia-Pacific structure before the power stucture hardens. 
Will ASEAN grab this opportunity or will it turn somewhat 
moribund, existing more and more in form because is unable 
or unwilling to confront problems within ASEAN and outside 
it? Shakespeare In Julius Caesar said (I hope one can be 
f orglven for bringing up this much quoted but neverthel 
p roprl te ge) 
"Th r I tld In th ff ir of men which, taken at the 
flood, I d on to fortun ; omit! , all the voyage of their life 
I b und In h llow ncl In I erl . n uch a full sea are 
w now flo l; nd we mu I take the current when it serve 
r lo our v nlur .11 
nly n by king wh ther A N will choose 
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Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, reprinted in Dialogue, (USIA, Washing 
ton D.C.) no. 101. 3/93, p. 4. Rosecrance himself, however, believes 
that the present moment for the blobe is the most hopeful period in 
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2. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon and Schuster, New York 1994), 
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